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Metaphor and stories in discourse about personal and social change 
L. David Ritchie 
 
Wagoner, Brady, Jensen, Eric, and Oldmeadow, Julian (Eds.), Culture and Social 
Change: Transforming society through the power of ideas.  London, UK:  Information 
Age Publishing.  2012. 
 
 Barack Obama campaigned on the theme of ‘change,’ and as the first African-
American to win the U. S. Presidency, he embodies changes of historical and cultural 
importance.  Central among the changes Obama advocates is his attempt, throughout his 
campaign, to depart from the ‘old politics’ and keep racial issues in the background.  
However, at a crucial point in the campaign he was forced to confront these issues when 
a potentially damaging controversy erupted over a series of comments, widely regarded 
as unpatriotic, made by his personal friend and spiritual adviser, the Reverend Jeremiah 
Wright.  How Obama dealt with this crisis is a prime example of the role of metaphor and 
stories in discourse about change, both in promoting and in dealing with change.  
 According to the standard rationalist prescription, Obama would have been 
expected to reason with his critics and refute their accusations.  A logical argument 
would lay out the issues to be decided in the form of propositions with truth-conditions or 
questions that can be answered by such propositions1.  But Obama did not use 
conventional logic, and he did not spin out explanatory theories or refute alternative 
theories about the incident (Kuhn, 1991).  Obama told stories, and he wove them together 
with a series of powerful, emotionally-charged metaphors.  Using this and other examples 
of public and private discourse, in this essay I argue that the non-propositional aspects of 
language use is as important as “content,” and that the perceptual, imaginative, emotional 
                                                 
1 What Bruner (1987) calls the paradigmatic mode of thought, in contrast to what Bruner calls the 
narrative mode, that characterized the bulk of Obama’s speech.  
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and relational nuances of language use can reveal at least as much about the role of 
communication in social change as the propositional aspects.    
 A different sort of crisis, also related to the role of ‘change agent,’ confronted 
then British Prime Minister Tony Blair during the early stages of the 2005 Parliamentary 
election, when he faced the risk of an intra-party split over his policies that might have 
cost Labour the election.  Here also, the prescriptions of logical argumentation would 
have called for propositions and rebuttals, theories and counter-theories.  But Blair also 
chose stories and metaphors, some of them playful, humorous, and whimsical (Ritchie, 
2008).  In place of reasoned arguments, in his speech to the 2005 Labour Party 
Conference at Gateshead Blair mixed and transformed familiar metaphors, he told 
amusingly quaint stories, and Labour won the election.   
 A crisis of political and cultural change confronted Jo Berry and Pat Magee in a 
more traumatic and intensely personal way.  After her father was killed by a bomb 
planted by Magee (acting as a member of the IRA), Berry went on a self-described 
‘journey of understanding,’ seeking to ‘walk in the footsteps of the bombers’ and, when 
Magee was released in a prisoner exchange, sought him out and engaged him in a series 
of personal conversations (Cameron, 2007).  Here again, traditional views of language 
and discourse would call for something more like a debate – an exchange of evidence-
based facts, views, and carefully reasoned arguments.  But here also, what actually 
occurred was an exchange of stories and metaphors.  In her insightful analysis of these 
conversations, Cameron shows how Berry and Magee overcame their ‘alterity,’ their 
deep political and emotional differences, through use, repetition, and transformation of 
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metaphors and stories to achieve mutual empathy and understanding and build a 
relationship of trust and respect.   
 The subtitle of this volume, Transforming society through the power of ideas, 
carries a suggestion of big changes, brought about through bold ideas.  In this reading, the 
role of communication might include transmitting information and ideas and persuading 
people to adopt and respond to these ideas, replacing previous ideological structures with 
new ones.  All of this would be consistent with a traditional view of language as a code in 
which this kind of information transmission and persuasion is accomplished, and a view 
of discourse as a chain of facts and opinions expressed in the form of propositions.   
I would not deny the value of what Bruner (1987) calls the “paradigmatic” mode 
of thinking, rational argument based on clear expression of evidence and views, either at 
the national and global level of politics and institutions or at the more intimate level of 
interpersonal relationships.  However, it does appear from the examples briefly described 
above, and from examples I will discuss later in this essay, that a complete account of the 
way people use language in creating or resisting, adapting to or controlling change cannot 
stop with the propositional aspects of language.  A complete account must also address 
the subtler and possibly more complex uses of language in stories and metaphors – and in 
word-play, humor, irony, and other examples of what Wilson and Sperber (2004) call 
‘loose’ language use.  In brief, I will suggest that “narrative” is at least as important as 
the “paradigmatic” expression of ideas in bringing about and dealing with social change.  
In this essay I focus less on the code-like and more on the interactive and 
relational aspects of language and communication.  I focus not only on the large-scale 
public processes of social and cultural transformation but also on the more intimate, often 
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quite personal processes through which people promote, resist, or accommodate change 
as they manage their everyday social realities.  I analyze discourse about change as it 
occurs in casual, ordinary conversations as well as in political speeches and organized 
public events.  I approach language use from a cognitive and interactive perspective, and 
show how attention to the patterns of story-telling, metaphor use and transformation, 
language play and humor can contribute to our understanding of change-based and 
change-related discourse.  
A cognitive and interactive model of language.  
 As mentioned in the preceding, Bruner (1987) drew a sharp distinction between 
what he called the paradigmatic or logico-scientific mode of thought and the narrative 
mode, and claimed that these are mutually irreducible.  However, Barsalou (1999) 
demonstrated that it is, in principle, possible to explain even abstract (paradigmatic) logic 
in terms of “perceptual simulations”2 (by incorporating introspective perception of one’s 
own mental processes), thus contradicting Bruner’s claim that the two are irreducibly 
separate.  Glenberg (2008) argues that the brain evolved primarily to control action, and 
produces extensive experimental evidence that language comprehension involves the 
simulation of action.  Other evidence suggests that the computational demands of living 
in large, complex social groups may have been a more important factor in the evolution 
of large brains (e.g. see Dunbar & Schultz, 2007).  Based on his research with individuals 
for whom reasoning was separated from emotion because of brain damage, Damasio 
(1995) argues that emotion is neither coincidental nor antithetical, but an essential part of 
effective reasoning.   
                                                 
2 The partial activation of the same neural groups that would become active in direct perception or action; 
perceptual simulation will be discussed in greater detail in a later section of this essay. 
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 Other evidence suggests that, whatever might be theoretically desirable, people do 
not naturally engage in the kind of paradigmatic argument advocated by Bruner.  In a 
field experiment testing people’s ability to construct and refute alternative explanations 
of common occurrences, Deanna Kuhn (1991) discovered that the only participants who 
could reliably satisfy her a priori expectations for constructing an argument, even within 
their own fields of expertise, were advanced doctoral candidates in philosophy (for 
detailed discussion see Ritchie, 1994; 2003).  In research on political advertising, 
Cappella and Jamieson (1994) have shown that the verbal content of ads is overwhelmed 
by the effect of accompanying images.   
 Traditional code / propositional models of language and associated linear models 
of communication have recently been challenged from several perspectives.  Wilson and 
Sperber (2004) point out that virtually all language is ‘loose’ in the sense that meanings 
of words and phrases are under-determined and require interpretation according to their 
relevance in a specific context.  The fundamental ambiguity of language limits the 
precision of communication but at the same time greatly increases the expressive power 
of language.  Based on this assessment, Wilson and Sperber claim that metaphor is but an 
extreme example of this fundamental ambiguity and is processed in exactly the same way 
as any other language (see also Wilson & Carston, 2006).  
 Lakoff and Johnson (1980; Lakoff, 2008) argue that metaphors observed in 
language use are manifestations of underlying conceptual metaphors, which develop 
from associations within perceptual experience and provide the basis for abstract 
conceptual thought.  Lakoff and Johnson claim that commonplace expressions (often 
regarded as “dead” metaphors) such as ‘a warm relationship,’ ‘a close friend,’ or ‘a big 
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problem’ all originate in and provide evidence 
of correlations between physical sensations 
(physical warmth and proximity, perceived size) 
and more abstract concepts (love and friendship, 
problem-solving).  Lakoff and Johnson, along 
with various collaborators, have identified 
hundreds of verbal metaphors which, they 
claim, instantiate underlying conceptual 
mappings of this sort.  Of particular importance 
are groups of metaphors based on common 
experiences such as TRAVEL, CONSTRUCTION, and CONFLICT3 (in addition to those already 
mentioned). 
Gibbs (2006; see also Lakoff, 2008) argues that both metaphorical and literal uses 
of language activate simulations based on schemas (inter-connected sets of perceptual 
and motor experience).  For example, the word fire activates simulations of a set of 
visual, tactile, and audial perceptions associated with combustion, and the word up 
activates simulations of visual and perhaps visceral perceptions of vertical motion.  When 
we read or hear a metaphorical use of a word, as for example ‘prices are going up again,’ 
we experience a conceptual blend in which prices are understood in terms of objects that 
are in vertical motion.4  Gibbs (1994; 2006; Gibbs & Matlock, 2008) reviews extensive 
                                                 
3 Throughout this essay I will follow Lakoff and Johnson’s inclusive definition of metaphor as experiencing 
(or expressing) one kind of thing as or in terms of another – thus, “warm relationship” is understood as 
metaphorical because affection is experienced in terms of physical temperature (see Zhong & Leonardelli, 
in press).  
4 Lakoff and Johnson (1980) claim that we actually experience prices as objects and inflation as vertical 
motion.  
 Notation:  I use the convention of 
marking metaphorical phrases by 
placing the metaphorical elements in 
italics and the entire phrase within 
quotation marks.  I refer to the 
concept that is described or expressed 
by the metaphor – for example the 
quality of a relationship – as the 
“topic” of the metaphor, the 
metaphorical words or phrase – in 
this case, “warm” or “close” – as the 
“vehicle.”  Following the convention 
used in the journal, Metaphor and 
Symbol, I put the broader concept 
underlying the vehicle in small caps, 
e.g., AFFECTION IS PHYSICAL 
WARMTH. 
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experimental evidence in support of this claim.5  The idea of simulations goes beyond the 
conventional idea of imagination:  in perceptual simulation, the neural circuits that would 
be fully activated by direct perception of fire or vertical motion are partially activated by 
encountering these concepts in language, either literal or metaphorical (Barsalou, 2007).   
Barsalou (2007) acknowledges that language, including metaphorical language, is 
sometimes processed in terms of connections to other words and phrases (see for example 
Kintsch, 1998; Landauer & Dumais, 1997).  However, he argues that deeper processing 
of language (and more complex reasoning) is accomplished through perceptual 
simulations, the partial activation of the same neural groups that would become active in 
direct perception.6  Given the constraints of cognitive capacity, the perceptual 
simulations experienced during language processing and during thought in general are 
always incomplete (it is easy to imagine, or simulate, the perceived shape of a zebra and 
its pattern of stripes – but not to count the stripes).  Which aspects of a concept are 
experienced is largely determined by what is most salient in the present context (cf. 
Giora, 2008; Sperber & Wilson, 1985; 2008).7   
 Metaphors in Obama’s speech.  When Obama characterized Reverend Wright’s 
language as ‘incendiary’ and referred to the ensuing controversy as a ‘firestorm,’ 
according to Conceptual Metaphor Theory hearers would actually experience Wright’s 
                                                 
5 Lakoff and Johnson include highly-conventionalized or “dead” metaphors such as “big” problem and 
“close” relationships within this explanation.  For criticisms of their position see for example Glucksberg 
and McGlone (1999), Murphy (1996), and Vervaeke and Kennedy (1996).   
6 Direct perception includes interoception, perception of one’s own bodily state, and introspection, 
perception of one’s own thoughts and emotions.  As noted in the preceding, abstract reasoning, according 
to Barsalou, is accomplished through these introspective simulations of cognitive experience.   
7 Resolving the question of the relative importance of paradigmatic logic, emotion, and perceptual 
simulation in cognition is beyond both the scope of this essay and the author’s competence.  The purpose 
here is rather to argue for the importance of metaphors and narratives for understanding the actual 
discursive processes through which people bring about, resist, and accommodate to social change and 
transformation.   
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language as a fire, based on the underlying conceptual metaphor, PASSION IS HEAT.  This 
is a common and familiar conceptual metaphor, expressed in poetry and music8 as well as 
everyday usage (e.g., ‘That burns me up’).  Perceptual simulations activated by these 
metaphors are accomplished through partial activation of the neural circuits that would be 
fully activated by actual perceptions of intense fire.  By repeating the metaphors based on 
FIRE and HEAT, Obama reinforced the underlying conceptual metaphor, intensifying and 
probably extending the experienced simulations.  For some of his listeners, this phrasing 
may also have evoked other connections with fire (both semantic and perceptual), 
including the Biblical allusion used as a title by African-American writer James Baldwin, 
‘The fire next time,’ as well as the race riots of the late 1960s that spawned the slogan, 
‘burn, baby, burn.’  Obama picks up the related HEAT metaphor in the phrase ‘seared into 
my genetic makeup,’ a phrase that also has the potential to evoke emotionally intense 
connections with the practice of branding slaves with hot irons.  
 Obama used repetition and transformation of common metaphors extensively, 
including metaphors based on JOURNEY.  At the beginning of his ‘campaign,’ Obama set 
the task to ‘continue the long march of those who came before us.’  The use of this 
metaphor potentially links the campaign to the literal ‘freedom marches’ of the Civil 
Rights movement as well as to the more conventional ‘march of progress’ metaphor.  
Asserting the need for unity, Obama observes that ‘we may not have come from the same 
place,9 but we all want to move in the same direction.’  Referring to the temptation to 
                                                 
8A good example is Peggy Lee’s masterful version of Fever, in which the “coolness” of her voice contrasts 
with and thus emphasizes the “heat” of her passion.   
9 “we may not have come from the same place” can be interpreted literally as well as metaphorically – 
Obama comes from Indonesia and Hawaii as well as Chicago, his mother and grandmother came from 
Kansas, and his father came from Kenya.  His later reference to relatives “scattered across three continents” 
reinforces a literal reading.   
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ignore ‘the issues that have surfaced… that we’ve never really worked through,’ Obama 
asserts that ‘if we walk away now… simply retreat into our respective corners10, we will 
never be able to come together…’   
 Cameron (2007; 2008) argues that this kind of repetition and transformation of 
metaphors provides clues to the speaker’s underlying patterns of thought and reveals the 
processes through which the conversation is managed and relationships between 
participants are developed.  In her analysis of the ‘reconciliation dialogues,’ Cameron 
shows how Jo Berry’s use of the JOURNEY and HEALING metaphors are picked up, 
repeated, and transformed by Pat Magee as a sign of his growing empathy for Berry.  
Cameron argues that Berry’s acceptance of Magee’s use of metaphors originally 
introduced by her signals a change in their relationship.    
 Stories.  Examples like those in the previous section illustrate a common but 
little-discussed aspect of metaphors:  They often have the potential to activate dynamic 
schemas, invoking incomplete simulations of familiar stories.  I have already alluded to 
the historical stories that may be activated by some of Obama’s metaphors; some of these 
are drawn from the history of the Civil Rights Movement, some from shared U.S. history.  
In the reconciliation dialogues, Jo Berry’s expression of her wish to ‘walk in the footsteps 
of the bombers’ may remind hearers or readers of relevant aspects of the intersecting 
stories of the IRA terror campaign and Berry’s own search for understanding and healing.   
 Many of the metaphors in Blair’s speech also imply stories.  When Blair said he 
would ‘welcome lost friends back into the fold’ he refered to a story about shepherds that 
has powerful Christian resonance.  The choice of Gateshead, in Blair’s home district, for 
                                                 
10 This is clearly a BOXING metaphor as well as a MOTION and SEPARATION metaphor.  
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the Labour Party conference and Blair’s long reference to it early in his speech 
potentially activated a powerful story of (literal and figurative) ‘homecoming.’   
 Obama also used location to evoke shared stories.  He delivered the race speech in 
Philadelphia’s Constitution Center, and quoted from the Preamble to the U.S. 
Constitution, thereby invoking the shared national story.  The phrase, ‘more perfect 
union,’ captures an ideal of perfection as an ideal to work toward, not a state to be 
achieved for once and for all, an ideal Obama invoked later in the speech by strategic re-
use of ‘perfect’ in a similarly non-literal sense.  Obama immediately invoked a second 
episode in the shared national history with his paraphrase and transformation of the 
opening lines of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address, ‘Two hundred and twenty one years 
ago… a group of men… launched America’s improbable experiment…’11  Thus he 
brought together the central themes of the Civil War and the Constitution which together 
provided a political and historical (as well as emotional) context for this speech about 
race relations – and for both bringing about the kind of transformations he sought, and 
helping his listeners to accept and embrace these transformations.   
Stories and memory  
 Schank and Abelson (1995) claim that stories are the primary medium of 
memory:  How we tell something is how we remember it.  Their first formulation of this 
idea implied that the first telling of a story in effect fixes that version as the way it is 
remembered, but they subsequently admitted that different versions of the same story can 
exist in parallel, and that re-telling of the story from a different perspective or in response 
to a different social situation can alter the way it is remembered.  Schank and Abelson do 
                                                 
11 These phrases allude to the opening lines of Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address:  “Four score and seven years 
ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived in Liberty…” 
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not address the implications of this theory for collective story-telling as a way of 
establishing and transforming collective memory but their overall account is entirely 
consistent with Sperber’s (1996) ideas about the formation of ‘cultural representations’ 
through repetition and refining of a common story.   
 Pasupathi, Weeks, & Rice (2008) describe remembering and retelling as an 
important process in adult development, both for accomplishing transitions throughout 
adult life and for accomplishing developmental tasks specific to later life.  They include 
within these developmental functions the maintenance and reinforcement of bonds within 
intimate relationships that are important throughout adulthood but especially later in life.  
Pasupathi et al. identify three broad functions of remembering and re-telling:  those 
associated with the teller’s sense of self, those associated with relationships with others, 
and those associated with problem-solving and goal-achievement.  Like Schank and 
Abelson, Pasupathi et al. emphasize the individual level but their analysis also carries 
important implications for the collective level of groups and communities, the level at 
which social transformation is accomplished and encountered.  These implications will 
become particularly evident in a later section in which I analyze a conversation among a 
group of neighbors about the role of sociability in maintaining a climate of public safety 
within a rapidly changing urban environment.   
 After setting the stage by blending the story of the founding of the nation, ‘two 
hundred and twenty one years ago,’ with the story of Lincoln and the Civil War and the 
story of the present occasion in which he was speaking, Obama proceeded to tell the story 
of his own Presidential candidacy.  This allowed him to set the story of his relationship 
with Reverend Wright and of the controversy over Wright’s language in the context of 
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both the national story and his personal story.  He then reframed the Wright story in 
terms of the Civil Rights story, and the justifiable anger of African-Americans at the 
history of discrimination and deprivation.   
 Having responded to the controversy over Reverend Wright through a 
combination of historical and personal themes, Obama turned to stories about ordinary 
working-class white people, and asserted that their anger is also justifiable.  This 
assertion was quite important because, in re-telling the familiar stories of enslavement 
and racial discrimination, Obama ran the risk that different segments of his national 
audience would understand and respond to the stories in different and mutually 
contradictory ways.  By explicitly acknowledging the justified anger of working-class 
whites, Obama converted a potentially divisive theme into a potentially uniting theme.  
He then fused these parallel sets of generic stories into a single story of the current 
political and economic crisis, linking this composite story to his Presidential campaign, 
and closing with a final, intensely personal story about two volunteers in his campaign.  
By retelling these stories and blending them into a single coherent story, he made what 
was previously ‘the Black story’ and ‘the White story’ become ‘the American story’; 
‘my’ story and ‘your’ story become ‘our’ story – which is one of the fundamental 
transformations he hoped to bring about.  
 Jo Berry and Pat Magee were involved in a similar integrative endeavor but on a 
much more personal level:  They were brought together by a single act of violence 
situated within a long and complex national story.  While this act of violence represented 
a single story it was understood very differently by each of them.  Their primary purpose 
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was to ‘listen to each other’s story,’ and thereby to understand the dual nature of the 
single story, so it could be blended into one complex and multi-faceted story.   
Stories and perceptual simulations.  
 Stories are themselves frequently metaphorical, in the broad sense that they lead 
hearers, or more accurately teller and hearers together, to experience one story or 
situation in terms of another. Thus, when Blair said, ‘where we have lost old friends, we 
try to persuade them to come back to the fold,’ he drew on a story that was very likely 
familiar to most members of his audience (‘Jesus is the good shepherd’), a story that 
already had strong metaphorical overtones, and re-applied it in a layered metaphor 
(‘Tony Blair is the good shepherd.’)   
 In a more complex example, after reflecting on the early years of his Prime 
Ministership, Blair alluded to recent intra-party disputes over the Iraq war and other 
policy issues, then launched into another story:  ‘all of a sudden there you are, the British 
people, thinking: you're not listening and I think: you're not hearing me. And before you 
know it you raise your voice. And I raise mine. Some of you throw a bit of crockery.  
And now you, the British people, have to sit down and decide whether you want the 
relationship to continue.’  Through this metaphorical story Blair re-expressed genuine 
political differences in terms of a marital spat, with many instantiations in popular 
culture.  This metaphorical story may have worked both to trivialize political objections 
and to create a shared enjoyment of the humorous image.  By re-telling the story of the 
political disagreements as a story of marital dispute – and potential reconciliation – Blair 
also established a new set of shared memories as the basis for renewed unity.  The policy 
differences could potentially be thereby ‘forgotten’ or at least suppressed.  
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 The amusing aspect of the ‘throwing crockery’ story highlights another important 
function of language, the creation and reinforcement of social bonds through shared 
pleasure.  Robin Dunbar (1996) refers to this process metaphorically as ‘grooming.’   
 Language and Social Bonding.  Noting that about 65% of all talk, among both 
men and women, is about relationships, and not necessarily concerned with ‘content’ or 
the accomplishment of informational ‘tasks’ as traditionally construed, Dunbar (1996) 
argues that language fulfils two fundamentally social purposes, which he labels 
‘grooming’ and ‘gossip.’  ‘Grooming,’ in Dunbar’s view, serves an extension and 
amplification of the social grooming behavior observed in most other primates, that 
serves to build and maintain ‘coalitions’ necessary for individual animals to maintain 
their position in the social hierarchy.  Conversation can comfortably take place among as 
many as four people, but it is possible for an animal to groom only one other animal at a 
time.  Hence the substitution of language for grooming greatly increases the size of 
potential social networks, and enables humans to achieve and maintain much larger 
primary groups.  ‘Gossip,’ in Dunbar’s view, complements ‘grooming’ by providing 
information about others’ relationships, and about the social behavior of other members 
of the group (Who is grooming whom?  Who can be trusted?  Who is a fink?)   
 The ‘grooming’ view proposed by Dunbar is consistent with the obvious fact that 
humans, everywhere, take pleasure in conversation.  We enjoy talking, and we enjoy 
hearing other people talk.  We especially enjoy listening to other people who talk well, 
who tell interesting stories and make funny quips – people who entertain us.  The shared 
enjoyment of talk, very likely experienced physiologically as the release of endorphins, 
may contribute to bonding by associating our conversation partners with pleasure.  
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 Dunbar’s account is largely speculative and controversial12, but it is evident that 
people do get pleasure from talk, and often engage in talk when there is no evident 
information-transfer need (‘Fine weather we’re having, isn’t it?’).  Given Dunbar’s 
estimate that about 2/3 of our time is spent talking about relationships or building and 
maintaining relationships through talk, the expression of paradigmatic propositions may 
not be nearly as important as traditional models of language use imply, and the shared 
enjoyment of interesting stories, metaphors, and humor may be much more important, a 
central rather than incidental function of language use.  Extending this argument, Ritchie 
and Dyhouse (2008; see also Fazioni, 2008) show that apparently frivolous language 
play, including novel and apparently meaningless metaphors as well as humor and 
teasing, may serve important relational functions simply by virtue of the shared pleasure 
they give speaker and audience.   
 From this perspective, the corny humor in Blair’s ‘crockery throwing’ story 
played a crucial role in the speech.  It must have been difficult even for his disgruntled 
critics to avoid at least a bit of a chuckle in response to the story, to avoid getting at least 
a bit of pleasure from the story.  This bit of corny humor reinforced the impression that 
much of the speech was not about propositional ‘content’ or arguments at all – it was 
about ‘grooming,’ pure and simple.  Blair’s metaphors and metaphorical stories very 
likely activated powerful perceptual imagery, and no doubt many listeners could not help 
experiencing pleasure as they processed these images (guilty pleasure perhaps, for some 
in the audience).  Experiencing the same perceptual imagery, and experiencing at least a 
mild bit of enjoyable humor together, the audience strengthened and renewed their bonds 
                                                 
12 Dunbar’s theory is supported by observed correlations between brain size and the size and complexity of 
social groups in many mammal and bird species, but it can also be criticized as biological reductionism 
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with each other – and with Blair.  Only then, with the bonds re-established, did Blair 
proceed to the more conventional campaign rhetoric – listing the party’s campaign 
promises and excoriating the policies proposed by the opposition.  
Managing social transformation at a personal and community level. 
 Thus far I have focused primarily on the kind of cultural and political 
transformations of which epic novels and multi-volume histories are made.  But people 
also confront change in the course of their everyday lives, as hopes and dreams 
materialize or fail to materialize, opportunities emerge or vanish, personal and 
professional roles change and familiar institutions mature or disappear.  In this section I 
will analyze a conversation in which a group of neighbors used story-telling, thematic 
metaphors, and occasional bits of humorous teasing both to understand and to reinforce 
the sense of community that underpins the stability and safety of their neighborhood.  
Four residents of a single block in a middle-income neighborhood of Portland, Oregon, a 
mid-sized city in the Pacific Northwest region of the United States, were invited to 
discuss concerns about crime and policing.  It quickly became clear that the participants 
had little interest in the topic of policing and more interest in affirming and reinforcing 
their shared sense of neighborliness and community.  In part, the participants were 
responding to general changes in the composition of the surrounding city and the 
neighborhood itself, in particular to changes associated with the natural succession of 
generations in their own neighborhood.    
 Throughout the conversation, several themes were woven together in a series of 
metaphors, metonyms, and stories.  A central theme of watchfulness drew on a metonym, 
‘eyes on the street,’ adapted from urban theorist Jane Jacobs’s (1961) classic study of the 
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social matrix of urban neighborhoods.  This theme was connected with sociability, 
mutual caring, and children as a resource in several passages.  Consistent with Bayley 
(1994) and Reed (1998), the primary focus throughout most of this conversation about 
public safety was not on the role of police agencies, but on the local community, the role 
of private citizens, both individually and in their ordinary communicative interactions, in 
maintaining a sense of public safety, and the implications of public safety for everyday 
activities and particularly for the activities of children.    
 Some of the stories focused on the contrast between this community and other, 
less ‘safe’ communities, but many of them focused on the shared history of this 
community itself, and on affirming the importance of children to the vitality of the 
community.  These stories served 1) to create and perpetuate a consensus about 
sociability as a basis for the mutual watchfulness that assures the safety of the 
neighborhood, 2) celebrate ‘the block’ as a place to live that is both socially and 
physically comfortable, and 3) affirm intergenerational solidarity.  Intergenerational 
solidarity was asserted by stories that affirmed the stake of older, childless couples in 
maintaining the street as a safe place for the children and by stories that affirmed the 
children themselves as sources of interest and pleasure, as sources of activity that reward 
the attention and watchfulness that renders the street and the neighborhood safe for them.   
 Although only one participant in the conversation has children, much of the 
conversation revolved around children.  Children figured both as markers of public 
safety, a kind of ‘indicator species’ for the health and safety of the community, and as a 
focus of sociability and watchfulness, sources of interest and liveliness that attract and 
reward adult attention, and (referring to the older children who live on the next block 
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over) as additional ‘eyes on the street.’  Thus, children are not only vulnerable people to 
be protected but also valued resources to be enjoyed, made welcome, and retained in the 
community:  In every instance in which children were mentioned, the vocal tone was 
warm and affectionate.   
 Several of the stories described how the four sets of parents on the block 
collaborate in supervising – and entertaining – their children.  Speaking for the other 
childless participants, Rich asserted that ‘it’s not just the ^parents^.. I mean it’s the rest of 
us.’  A few minutes later, Leanne reinforced this idea with a story of her own about 
walking home from the bus-stop when the kids are home from school, and ‘they’re ^out 
there^ having fun.. and I can talk to them and visit.. walking to our house…’  This 
segment continued with an account (produced collaboratively with Todd) of how the four 
sets of parents trade off responsibility for watching the children.  From Leanne’s story it 
is evident that the children ‘out there having fun’ are a source of enjoyment to her.  The 
fact that Todd (the one parent in the group) collaborated with her in telling the story 
suggests that the exchange successfully produced a ‘shared reality’ (Higgins, 2003).  
 Leanne made her enjoyment of the children on the street even more evident in a 
passage, ten minutes later, in which she described an interaction with one of the children 
who live near the end of the block:  
I was walking down the street.. she was sitting there she .. she^ jumps up^ and she 
said.. I said How are you she said..  Today was the ^first day^ of ^first ^grade^^!   
^and it was just ^wonderful^^!  And she had on this .. this ^black^ leotard and white 
tights and little shoes.. and she said.. ^and^ I’m going to be going to ^dance class^ 
now.. and ^after^wards my dad is going to take me to the ^park^ and it’s like the 
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^best^ day of my ^life^!  eh heh!.. and she was ^literally^ bouncing up.. and.. 
down.. I mean she could not ^stay still^ .. she was so excited …  that was just… 
^wonder^ful .. you know? it was just ^fantastic^ to be able to live on a street where 
you can ^see that^ every day   
 Through this and other stories, related in tones of affection and amusement, 
Leanne and the other childless participants made it clear that they see the presence of 
young children in the neighborhood as adding value, both because of the social 
relationships they crystallize and because of their contribution to the liveliness of the 
street.  On the surface, these stories were told to instantiate the sense of security and 
sociability, and the relationship between sociability and security.  But they also appear to 
have been part of a strategy of building and maintaining the integration of the young 
families in the community, and securing the continued commitment of the four sets of 
parents, with Todd as a surrogate, to the neighborhood.  More generally, by sharing these 
pleasant stories, the participants in the conversation strengthened their own social bonds 
(Dunbar, 1996) and reinforced a shared understanding of the neighborhood as a friendly, 
safe, and stable environment.  
 Building and maintaining mutual commitment.  The stories, metaphors, and 
occasional bits of teasing all served to establish, attest, and maintain the mutual 
understanding that the sociability and mutual caring described in various ways.  The 
childless members of the group used affectionate stories about watching the children, and 
occasional teasing of Todd for his apparent ‘over-protectiveness,’ to establish that 
children are welcomed and valued, and to reinforce the commitment of the families on 
the block, as a way of maintaining the values of sociability and mutual stability.  Talk 
Metaphor and change v.3 1/14/2020 20 
about the annual block party (in which the street is closed off for the afternoon and 
evening while neighbors gather to share food and drink), a metonymic reification of ‘The 
Block’ as a special place, and the recounting of other conversations about the 
neighborhood all reinforced the shared vision of ‘The Block’ as a community of mutual 
caring and ‘watchfulness.’  It appears that these metaphorical and metonymic themes, and 
to an even greater extent the stories told by various participants, fit within a conscious 
rhetorical strategy of accomplishing and maintaining the sociability and mutual 
commitment that participants recognized, early in the conversation, as the basis for the 
sense of safety and security they all enjoy.  In brief, the web of stories, metaphors, 
metonyms, and good-natured teasing was constructed collaboratively as a strategy of 
maintaining the stability and cohesion of this neighborhood as a mutually protective 
social unit in the face of change – both the change of generations within the 
neighborhood and the larger-scale changes in the surrounding city.  Some of this may be 
evident in the informative ‘content’ of the discourse13, but it is much more evident in the 
emotional and perceptual dimensions of the stories, metaphors, and teasing that 
dominated the conversation.   
The role of non-propositional talk in discourse about social transformation  
 At each level – societal, community, and individual – change requires adjustments 
to what is known and believed, to ‘knowledge.’  Part of this knowledge takes a 
paradigmatic or propositional form, e.g. ‘the difficulties experienced by many African-
Americans can be traced to the history of slavery and ante-bellum segregation,’ ‘if the 
Labour Party engages in intra-party feuding we will lose the election,’ ‘effective 
                                                 
13 One example of propositional content came late in the conversation when one of the participants 
explicitly cited Jane Jacobs (1961) in support of claims about the importance of a street-centered social life.  
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communication with the public and with policy-makers is necessary in order to maintain 
continued funding for science,’ and ‘casual socializing with neighbors helps maintain 
mutual watchfulness and contributes to safety from crime.’  But much of the knowledge 
takes the form of stories about the past, about how things are done in the present, and 
about hopes and plans for the future.  Much of it takes the form of imaginative re-creation 
of events and experiences, stimulated by repetition of metaphors and stories.  And much 
of it takes the form of inter-personal relationships, a sense of who can and cannot be 
trusted, feelings of mutual enjoyment, commitment and obligation.  
 I have shown how this non-propositional basis for dealing with change is 
constructed, not through arguments, facts, and reasoning but through metaphors, stories 
and humor.  Obama repeated the old dividing stories and metaphors in a way that blended 
them into new uniting stories and metaphors.  Blair repeated Biblical stories and blended 
them with the more particular stories of his years as Prime Minister, then contrasted the 
blend with a comic story of domestic altercation to highlight the importance and the 
possibility of unity.  The neighbors repeated shared stories of everyday interactions in 
their neighborhood in the new context of a discussion about public safety as a way of 
giving new meaning to their sociability and reinforcing their mutual commitment to the 
community.   In each case, understanding the discursive processes and their relationship 
to the problems and opportunities associated with social change requires attention, not 
merely to the propositional content of the language, but also to the imagined or simulated 
experience of perceptions and emotions associated with the metaphors, stories, word-play 
and teasing.  
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 Conversely, focusing on the propositional ‘content’ and ignoring the simulations 
(schemas, perceptions, emotions, etc.) and semantic links to other knowledge that are 
activated by strongly expressive language can contribute to overly simplistic analysis of 
public discourse.  An example occurs in Jensen’s account of the firing of comedian Bill 
Maher because of comments made shortly after the September 11th attacks on the World 
Trade Center.  In response to a statement in which President Bush called the attackers 
‘cowards,’ Maher said ‘We have been the cowards, lobbing cruise missiles from 2,000 
miles away. That's cowardly.  Staying in the airplane when it hits the building, say what 
you want about it, it's not cowardly’.  According to Jensen’s analysis, Maher was the 
victim of ‘corporate censorship’ resulting from the withdrawal of sponsorship, apparently 
at least partly in response to ‘vaguely menacing’ statements by White House press 
secretary Ari Fleischer.   
 Considering only the propositional content, Bush’s statement does seem 
preposterous, and Maher’s remarks seem reasonable.  Holding oneself back from 
personal danger is indeed closer to the conventional definition of ‘cowardly’ than putting 
oneself in personal danger – even when the intent in the latter case is manifestly both 
homicidal and suicidal.  Bush’s use of the word in this context is contradicted by the 
‘dictionary definition’ of cowardice, and Maher’s remarks were consistent with that 
definition.  But when the schemas and emotions activated by the words and phrases are 
taken into account, things get more complicated.  The context, a nation and in particular 
the families of thousands of victims who were still in the early stages of grieving, must 
also be considered:  The ideas and emotions associated with President Bush’s words 
(however ineptly chosen) were quite consistent with the emotional response to an 
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unprovoked attack on non-combatants engaged in routine daily activities.  As such, 
Bush’s words were intended to be, and were in fact comforting not merely to the families 
of the victims but also to the millions of others who shared their shock and grief.  
 Conversely the ideas and emotions associated with Maher’s words (however 
logically apt) implied praise for the attackers and censure of the victims.  At the time 
they were spoken, they were like pouring salt in raw wounds.  Contrary to the 
implications of Jensen’s analysis, it was not merely the White House Press Secretary and 
the ‘Corporate Fat Cats’ who controlled ABC’s advertising revenues who were offended.  
Maher’s comments were not ‘politically incorrect’ so much as they were emotionally 
insensitive.  It may be possible to construct an argument that this incident exemplifies 
corporate censorship, but to be convincing, it would be necessary to consider how the 
associated ideas and emotions interacted with the full context.  By focusing on the 
propositional definition of ‘cowardly’ and ignoring the associated ideas, images, and 
emotions activated by the uses of the word in this particular context, Jensen’s analysis 
misses an important part of the underlying dynamic.   
 On the other hand, analysis of associated ideas, images, and emotions supports 
other aspects of Jensen’s analysis.  Jensen quotes then White House press secretary Ari 
Fleischer’s ‘cautionary and vaguely menacing statement: “they're reminders to all 
Americans that they need to watch what they say, watch what they do. This is not a time 
for remarks like that.”’  Here, the propositional content does not seem particularly 
menacing – it is literally true that a time of mourning is not the time for praising the 
attackers.  Fleischer’s remarks, however, have the potential to activate schemas of ‘secret 
police’ eavesdroppers, ‘informers,’ and ‘enemies lists’ dating back to the Cold War and 
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the Nixon Presidency, and even beyond to 1950s “Red-baiting.”  It is these associated 
simulations and schemas, not the propositional content, than render Fleischer’s remarks 
menacing.   
 It is manifestly true that corporate power is often used to censor views that are 
either politically unpopular or merely damaging to corporate interests, and censorship 
may have been a factor here – it certainly seems evident that Bush was already laying the 
propaganda groundwork for his subsequent war-making and for his outrageous expansion 
of Presidential power.  But there is also a case to be made that Maher’s unfeeling 
remarks, at the time when he made them, fit within the widely-accepted “shouting fire in 
a crowded theater” and “fighting words” exceptions to the principle of free speech.  
Considering the context and the simulations as well as the propositional content of 
Maher’s remarks, the case can made that Maher deserved censure for the emotional and 
relational effects of his comments and that his firing from ABC was a reasonable 
response to his emotional insensitivity.  In brief, a complete account of an incident of this 
sort must include attention to the perceptual simulations, the associated ideas, images, 
and emotions, as well as to the propositional content of what is actually written or 
spoken, and in many cases the perceptual simulations may be by far the more important.  
Conclusion  
 I have argued for attention to the perceptual and imaginative, the emotional and 
relational implications of language as well as to the paradigmatic or propositional 
“content” of discourse related to social change, and for attention to change at the level of 
individual relationships and small-scale communities as well as at the level of nations and 
large-scale cultures.  I have shown how attention to the non-propositional aspects of 
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language can be at least as revealing as attention to the propositional aspects.  Patterns of 
metaphor use and transformation and patterns of story-telling and transformation are 
particularly revealing, as is the playful or humorous distortion of familiar metaphors and 
stories.  The transformation and transmission of ideas (in propositional form) and the 
presentation of paradigmatic evidence in well-structured logical arguments is of 
undoubted importance, but I have argued that the building and reinforcement of 
relationships and interpersonal commitments through language use is of no less 
importance.  Understanding processes of social transformation at any level requires 
attention to these interpersonal and relational aspects of society, which in turn require 
attention to the nuances of language in discourse, both the grand discourse of politicians 
and thinkers and the casual conversations of ordinary people as they go about their lives.   
 Politicians are frequently criticized for relying on stories and metaphors instead of 
paradigmatic reasoning and “well-formed arguments.”  It is evident from recent press 
reports of the “moot court” style debates in Obama’s cabinet meetings that he is perfectly 
capable of this style of discourse.  But it also seems quite evident that, had he addressed 
the American voters in that vein on March 18, 2008, with a list of well-formed arguments 
demonstrating the legitimate basis for Jeremiah Wright’s anger toward the United States 
government and the rightness of his own loyalty to Reverend Wright, he would have lost 
the election, and the transformations brought about by his election would have been 
deferred, possibly for another decade or longer.  What I hope to have shown in this essay 
is that metaphors and stories and the perceptual simulations and emotions they activate, 
the changes in shared memories they bring about, have an important part in the processes 
of social and cultural transformation – and in our understanding of those processes.  
Metaphor and change v.3 1/14/2020 26 
References 
 Barsalou, L. W. (2007).  Grounded cognition.  Annual Review of Psychology, 59, 
617-45.   
 Barsalou, L.  (1999).  Perceptual symbol systems.  Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 22, 577-609.   
 Bayley, D. H.  (1994).  Police for the future.  NYC, NY:  Oxford University 
Press.   
 Bruner, J. (1987).  Actual minds, possible worlds.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard.  
 Cameron, L. J. (2008).  Metaphor shifting in the dynamics of talk.  Pp. 45-62 in 
Zanotto, M. S., Cameron, L., and Cavalcanti, M. C. (Eds.), Confronting metaphor in use:  
An applied linguistic approach.  Ambsterdam:  John Benjamins.   
 Cameron, L. J. (2007).  Patterns of metaphor use in reconciliation talk.  Discourse 
and Society, 18, 197-222.   
 Cappella, J. N., and Jamieson, K. H. (1994).  Broadcast Adwatch Effects:  A Field 
Experiment.  Communication Research, 21, 342-365.  
 Damasio, A. R.  (1995).  Descartes' error : Emotion, reason, and the human 
brain.  New York, NY:  Quill.   
 Dunbar, R.  (1996).  Grooming, gossip, and the evolution of language.  
Cambridge, MA:  Harvard.   
 Dunbar, R. I. M. and Shultz, S. (2007)  Evolution in the Social Brain.  Science 
317, 1344 - 1347 
Metaphor and change v.3 1/14/2020 27 
 Fazioni, O. (2008).  The role of humor and play in a workplace interaction.  
Portland, OR:  Portland State University.  A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Communication Studies.   
 Gibbs, R. W. Jr. (2006).  Metaphor interpretation as embodied simulation.  Mind 
and Language, 21, 434-458.   
 Gibbs, R. W. Jr. (1994).  The poetics of mind:  Figurative thought, language, and 
understanding.  Cambridge, England:  Cambridge University Press.  
 Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr., and Matlock, T.  (2008).  Metaphor, imagination, and 
simulations:  Psycholinguistic evidence.  Chapter 9, pp. 161-176 in Gibbs, Raymond W., 
Jr., Ed.,  The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought.  Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge University Press.   
 Giora, R.  (2008).  Is metaphor unique?  Chapter 8, pp. 143-160 in Gibbs, 
Raymond W., Jr., Ed.,  The Cambridge handbook of metaphor and thought.  Cambridge, 
UK:  Cambridge University Press.   
 Glucksberg, S. and McGlone, M. (1999).  When love is not a journey:  What 
metaphors mean.  Journal of Pragmatics, 31, 1541-58. 
 Higgins, E. T.  (2003).  Achieving ‘shared reality’ in the communication game:  A 
social action that creates meaning.  Pp. 431-444 in Kruglanski, Arie W., and Higgins, E. 
Tory (Eds.), Social Psychology:  A general reader.  New York, NY:  Psychology Press. 
 Jacobs, J.  (1961).  Death and life of great American cities.  NYC, NY:  Random 
House.   
 Jensen, E. (this volume) Mediating social change in authoritarian and democratic 
states: Irony, hybridity and corporate censorship.   
Metaphor and change v.3 1/14/2020 28 
 Kintsch, W. (1998).  Comprehension:  A paradigm for cognition.  Cambridge, 
England:  Cambridge University Press.   
 Kuhn, D..  (1991). The skills of argument.  Cambridge, England:  Cambridge 
University Press. 
 Lakoff, G. (2008).  The neural theory of metaphor.  Chapter 1, pp. 17-38 in Gibbs, 
R. W., Jr. (Ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor and Thought.  Cambridge, UK:  
Cambridge University Press.   
 Lakoff, G., and Johnson, M. (1980). Metaphors we live by. Chicago, IL:  
University of Chicago Press.  
 Landauer, T. K., and Dumais, S. T. (1997). A solution to Plato’s problem:  The 
latent semantic analysis theory of acquisition induction, and representation of knowledge. 
Psychological Review, 104, 211-240.   
 Murphy, G. (1996).  On metaphorical representation.  Cognition, 60, 173-204. 
 Pasupathi, M., Weeks, T., and Rice, C. (2008).  Reflecting on life:  Remembering 
as a major process in adult development.  Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 
25, 244-263. 
 Reed, W. E. (1998).  The Politics of Community Policing: The Case of Seattle 
(Current Issues in Criminal Justice, Vol 25).  Routledge.   
Ritchie, L. D. (2008).  Gateshead revisited:  Perceptual simulators and fields of 
meaning in the analysis of metaphors.  Metaphor and Symbol 23, 24 – 49.  
 Ritchie, L. D. (2006).  Context and Connection in Metaphor.  Basingstoke, UK:  
Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.   
Metaphor and change v.3 1/14/2020 29 
 Ritchie, L. D. (2003).  Uncertainty and the fragmentation of knowledge.  In B. 
Dervin & S. Chaffee (Eds.), Communication:  A different kind of horse race.  Essays 
honoring Richard F. Carter. Cresskill, NJ:  Hampton Press.    
 Ritchie, L. D. (1994).  Objectivity, doubt, and the two cultures.  Journal of 
Communication, 44(1), 65-72.  
Ritchie, L. D., and Dyhouse, V. (2008).  Hair of the Frog and other Empty 
Metaphors:  The Play Element in Figurative Language.  Metaphor and Symbol, 23, 85-
107.   
Schank, R. C. and Abelson, R. P.  (1995).  Knowledge and memory:  The real 
story.  In Robert S. Wyer (ed.),  Knowledge and memory:  The real story.  Advances in 
Social Cognition, Vol. VIII.  Hillsdale, NJ:  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1-86.  
 Sperber, D.  (1996).  Explaining culture:  A naturalistic approach.  London:  
Blackwell.   
 Sperber, D., and Wilson, D. (1986; 1995).  Relevance:  Communication and 
cognition.  Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press.   
 Sperber, D. and Wilson, D.  (2008).  A deflationary account of metaphors.  
Chapter 5, pp. 84-105 in Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr., Ed.,  The Cambridge handbook of 
metaphor and thought.  Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press. 
 Vervaeke, J. and Kennedy, J. M. (1996).  Metaphors in language and thought:  
Falsification and multiple meanings.  Metaphor and Symbolic Activity, 11(4), 273-284.  
 Wilson, D., and Carston, R. (2006).  Metaphor, relevance and the ‘emergent 
property’ issue.  Mind & Language, 21, 404-433.  
Metaphor and change v.3 1/14/2020 30 
 Wilson, D. and Sperber, D. (2004).  Relevance Theory.  Chapter 27, pp.607-632 
in Horn, Laurence R. and Ward, Gregory, eds., The handbook of pragmatics.  Oxford, 
UK:  Blackwell Publishing. 
 Zhong, Chen-Bo, and Leonardelli, Geoffrey J.  (in press).  Cold and lonely:  Does 
social exclusion literally feel cold?  To appear in Psychological Science.  
 
